Hofstra Law Review
Volume 43

Issue 3

Article 6

1-1-2015

Implicit Bias and Capital Decision-Making: Using Narrative to
Counter Prejudicial Psychiatric Labels
Sean D. O'Brien
Kathleen Wayland

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
O'Brien, Sean D. and Wayland, Kathleen (2015) "Implicit Bias and Capital Decision-Making: Using Narrative
to Counter Prejudicial Psychiatric Labels," Hofstra Law Review: Vol. 43 : Iss. 3 , Article 6.
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol43/iss3/6

This document is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Hofstra Law Review by an authorized administrator of Scholarly Commons at Hofstra
Law. For more information, please contact lawlas@hofstra.edu.

O'Brien and Wayland: Implicit Bias and Capital Decision-Making: Using Narrative to Cou

IMPLICIT BIAS AND CAPITAL
DECISION-MAKING: USING NARRATIVE TO
COUNTER PREJUDICIAL PSYCHIATRIC LABELS
Sean D. 0 'Brien*
Kathleen Wayland*

I.

INTRODUCTION

Psychiatric labels are often used in judicial proceedings involving
issues of life, liberty, or access to rehabilitative treatment. The Hofstra
Law Review invited us to expand our recent discussion of the use of such
labels to invoke prejudicial stereotypes in death penalty cases. 1 Our
previous discussion urged courts to reconsider the admissibility of the
construct of psychopathy and evidence of certain "personality disorders"
because of serious questions and controversies in the mental health field
over the reliability and validity of such evidence.2 We also suggested
that capital defense teams can undermine and rebut that evidence by
complying with contemporary standards of performance articulated in
the American Bar Association ("ABA") Guidelines on the Appointment
and Performance of Defense Counsel in Death Penalty Cases
("Guidelines") and the Supplementary Guidelines on the Mitigation
Function of Capital Defense Teams ("Supplementary Guidelines").3
* Sean D. O'Brien is an Associate Professor at University of Missouri-Kansas City School
of Law, where he teaches courses in criminal law, the death penalty, and mental health law.
** Kathy Wayland, Ph.D., is a clinical psychologist who consults with capital defense teams
and specializes in issues related to mitigation themes, psychological trauma, and mental health. We
are grateful for the advice and assistance we received from Andrew Rowland, Ph.D.; National
Mitigation Coordinator Russel Stetler; and University of Missouri-Kansas City School of Law
Student and Research Assistant Sarah Jackson.
1. See generally Kathleen Wayland & Sean D. O'Brien, Deconstructing Antisocial
Personality Disorderand Psychopathy: A Guidelines-BasedApproach to PrejudicialPsychiatric
Labels, 42 HOFSTRA L. REV. 519 (2013).
2. Id. at 528-31, 558-61, 565-66.
3. ABA GUIDELINES FOR THE APPOINTMENT AND PERFORMANCE OF DEFENSE COUNSEL IN
DEATH PENALTY CASES (rev. ed. 2003), in 31 HOFSTRA L. REV. 913 (2003) [hereinafter ABA
GUIDELINES], available at http://www.ambar.org/2003Guidelines; SUPPLEMENTARY GUIDELINES
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Given the length and depth of that discussion, we could only briefly
discuss the importance of counter-narrative; the defendant's life story,
based on an extensive longitudinal and developmental investigation of
the defendant and his family's life trajectory, is the most effective tool to
counter the dehumanizing effect of prejudicial psychiatric labels.
Adherence to tried-and-true standards of practice calling for
the presentation of narrative mitigating evidence transcends the
proverbial "battle of the experts" over diagnostic labels that fails to
humanize the client.
Every homicide prosecution involves a compelling narrative of a
violent crime committed by the defendant. Our original article explained
how prosecutors' prejudicial psychiatric labels, such as "Antisocial
Personality Disorder" ("ASPD") and "psychopathy," are used to
advance that narrative by invoking stereotypes that fuel fear and reduce
the decision-maker's natural reluctance to kill another human being.4
Prosecutors use these labels to appeal to jurors' and judges'
preconceived notions about violent offenders that define them as
"Other," making it easier for them to execute the defendant. In Part II,
we explore examples of cases in which the client's humanity became
lost in litigation focusing on diagnostic labels and psychometric testing.5
Although the defense against the death penalty in each of these cases
may have been built upon accepted principles of forensic mental health
testimony, it was not sufficiently persuasive to withstand the slightest
inconsistency or rebuttal. We suggest that such cases place the focus in
the wrong place; it is6 the client's life story, not diagnostic labels, that
reveals his humanity.
Part III explores human decision-making processes in relation to
preexisting cognitive mindsets, which bias the processing and
interpretation of information, and can influence behavior.7 Cognitive
psychology provides a useful framework for explaining human
perceptions, and how implicit or explicit biases can interfere with the

FOR THE MITIGATION FUNCTION OF DEFENSE TEAMS IN DEATH PENALTY CASES, in 36 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 677 (2008) [hereinafter SUPPLEMENTARY GUIDELINES]; Wayland & O'Brien, supra note 1, at

530-31.
4.

Wayland & O'Brien, supra note 1, at 525-28; see also DAVID GROSSMAN, ON KILLING:

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL COST OF LEARNING TO KILL IN WAR AND SOCIETY 30 (1995) (analyzing

military data showing soldiers' reluctance to kill even in warfare); Craig Haney, Violence and the
Capital Jury: Mechanisms of Moral Disengagement and the Impulse to Condemn to Death, 49
STAN. L. REV. 1447, 1451-60 (1997) (detailing the strategic process of dehumanization in capital
cases).
5. See infra text accompanying notes 30-47.
6. See infra text accompanying notes 48-51; Part III.
7. See infra Part III.
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objective interpretation of data in ways that affect judgment and
behavior. This research underscores the importance of narrative to the
decision-maker's ability to understand and respond to mitigating
evidence, especially when such evidence includes psychiatric or
cognitive impairments. Capital Jury Project ("CJP") data has shown that
jurors have difficulty assimilating mitigating mental health testimony
because they distrust mental health experts as "hired guns," and because
the "antisocial" or "psychopathic" labels invoke the fictitious popularculture stereotypes of violent criminals. 8 This tendency is exacerbated by
the use of psychiatric labels, which are particularly damaging and
inherently flawed. As a result, life-or-death decisions can be made based
on damaging stereotypes and pervasive cultural myths associated with
criminal behavior and prejudicial psychiatric labels.
On the other hand, a defense compliant with prevailing standards
enables decision-makers to accommodate new information about the
defendant by altering or expanding their schemata to interpret the new
information. In Part IV, we examine successful cases in which expert
testimony is presented in the context of a humanizing life history
narrative, as told by lay people and lay experts who know the client. 9
This enables juries to transcend stereotypes, and to identify with the
defendant-to see him in some fundamental way as being like
themselves. Jurors who can experience the client's distress can also
empathize with him, and are more likely to respond with mercy. The
same information presented as a bare chronology of the defendant's life
or rote recitation of risk factors, devoid of narrative principles such as
plot and conflict, does not produce an empathetic response. Experience
shows that a thoroughly investigated, truthful narrative of the
defendant's life, told by those who know, love, and understand him,
actually works, even in the most aggravated homicide cases.
In Part V, we conclude that the most effective tool to counter these
incomplete and misleading stereotypes is to present a compelling,
humanizing narrative that extends backwards into the developmental
trajectory of the defendant's life and family. 10 This is why prevailing
standards of practice demand a detailed life history investigation
8. See infra text accompanying notes 65-73, 98-107. The CJP was initiated in 1991 by a
consortium of university-based researchers from fourteen states with support from the National
Science Foundation. What Is the CapitalJury Project?,SCH. CRIM. JUST. ST. UNW. N.Y. ALBANY,
http://www.albany.edu/scj/13189.php (last visited Apr. 12, 2015). The CJP was designed to: (1)
systematically describe jurors' exercise of capital sentencing discretion; (2) assess the extent of
arbitrariness in jurors' exercise of such discretion; and (3) evaluate the efficacy of capital statutes in
controlling such arbitrariness. Id. For more information, see id.
9. See infra Part IV.
10. See infra Part V.
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conducted by a qualified team applying prevailing standards of practice,
as described in the Guidelines and Supplementary Guidelines. 1
Investigating, developing, and presenting the client's humanizing
narrative are indispensable components of contemporary standards of
performance for capital defense counsel. 12 These standards provide an
effective roadmap that enables the defense team to uncover and tell the
stories of the defendant's life that reveal his innate humanity.
II.

LABELS, STEREOTYPES, AND THE "BATTLE OF THE EXPERTS"

"[It] is not clear to us[] that psychiatric terminology affects
juries. ""
- Chief Judge Frank Easterbrook
"The detrimentalimpact of the public stigma of people with mental
illness cannot be overstated.,,14
- Melody S. Sadler et al., Sterotypes of Mental Disorders Differ in
Competence and Warmth
As discussed in our original article, the prosecution uses labels,
such as "ASPD," "sociopathy," and "psychopathy," to appeal to the
fictional Hollywood stereotype of the remorseless predator depicted in
such movies as Silence of the Lambs 15 or Natural Born Killers.16 Dr.
11.

ABA GUIDELINES, supra note 3, Guideline 10.7,

GUIDELINES, supra note 3, Guideline 5.1, at 682-83.
12. See generally ANTHONY G. AMSTERDAM & JEROME

at 1021-26; SUPPLEMENTARY

S. BRUNER,

MINDING THE LAW

(2nd

prtg. 2002) (explaining how storytelling influences the Supreme Court's decisions regarding the
death penalty); LINDA H. EDWARDS, READINGS IN PERSUASION: BRIEFS THAT CHANGED THE
WORLD (2012) (discussing the importance of framing emotional narratives in advocating for
clients); PHILIP N. MEYER, STORYTELLING FOR LAWYERS (2014) (explaining the importance of
narratives in good lawyering); Sean D. O'Brien, Death Penalty Stories: Lessons in Life-Saving
Narratives, 77 UMKC L. REV. 831 (2009) (finding that the use of narratives can be life-saving in
death penalty cases); Alex Kotlowitz, In the Face of Death, N.Y. TIMES, July 6, 2003, at 32
(illustrating an excellent example of a successful, well-constructed, and humanizing capital defense
narrative). We have found the research and writing of Professor Craig Haney, a professor trained in
both psychology and law, to be especially insightful about the intersection of mental health and
crime narratives. See generally Haney, supra note 4; Craig Haney, On Mitigation as CounterNarrative:A Case Study of the Hidden Context of Prison Violence, 77 UMKC L. REV. 911 (2009)
[hereinafter Haney, Prison Violence]; Craig Haney, The Social Context of CapitalMurder: Social
Histories and the Logic of Mitigation, 35 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 547 (1995) [hereinafter Haney,
Social Context].
13. 686 F.3d 404,408(7th Cir. 2012).
14. Melody S. Sadler et al., Stereotypes of Mental Disorders Differ in Competence and
Warmth, 74 SOC. SC. & MED. 915, 915 (2012).
15. SILENCE OF THE LAMBS (Orion Pictures 1991).
16. NATURAL BORN KILLERS (Warner Brothers Pictures 1994); see Haney, Social Context,
supra note 12, at 552; Wayland & O'Brien, supra note 1, at 519, 525.
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Craig Haney explains that invoking images of these archetypal villains
"justifies harsh treatment and insulates us from moral concerns about the
suffering we inflict." 7 Even though there is no scientific support for
such Hollywood stereotypes, they "have become so much a part of the
public's 'knowledge' about crime and punishment that, despite their
fictional, socially constructed quality, they wield significant power in
actual legal decisions." 1 8 Uncorrected, the stereotype distorts judicial
decision-making in multiple ways. A person upon whom such labels are
affixed is deemed dangerous, manipulative, selfish, impulsive,
remorseless, adept at malingering mental illness, and beyond treatment
or rehabilitation.' 9 This image of the defendant only widens the
"'empathic divide' that exists between many white jurors and
African-American defendants."2 °
In the prosecutor's narrative, the victim of the homicide is the tragic
protagonist, our client's crime is the trouble that upsets the moral
balance of the universe, and the jury can, through its verdict, restore the
universe to a new state of moral balance. 2' It is virtually always a
compelling narrative that portrays the defendant as a one-dimensional
predatory creature. Professor Philip N. Meyer explains the concept of the
"flat character" in narrative theory: "[W]hat they lack, typically, is
psychological complexity or the ability to change., 22 No evidence is as
helpful to the prosecution in this effort as "scientific" proof that the
defendant is indeed "flat" by virtue of being without human emotions or
conscience, and beyond treatment or redemption.23 A narrative
17. Craig Haney, Exoneration and Wrongful Condemnations: Expanding the Zone of
Perceived Injustice in Death Penalty Cases, 37 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 131, 145 (2006).
18. Haney, Social Context, supra note 12, at 559. See generally Craig Haney, Media
Criminology and the Death Penalty, 58 DEPAUL L. REV. 689 (2009) (citation omitted).
19. See Wayland& O'Brien, supranote 1, at 527.
20. Craig Haney, Condemning the Other in Death Penalty Trials: Biographical Racism,
Structural Mitigation, and the Empathic Divide, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 1557, 1558 (2004).
21. The prosecution's crime narrative appeals to a narrative structure as described by
Professor Linda H. Edwards:
In another common plot structure, the key characteristic of the story's opening scene is
its normality and stability. The world is not incomplete and life is more or less as it
should be. However, this initially stable world enters a stage of disequilibrium.
Amsterdam and Bruner refer to this as a "steady state" followed by "trouble." The steady
state is, by definition, legitimate-the legitimate ordinary. In narrative terms, whatever
disrupts a steady state is bad. The story describes the struggle to resolve the
disequilibrium and return to some version of legitimate stability-either to the original
steady state (restoration) or to some other good and stable place (transformation).
Linda H. Edwards, Once Upon a Time in Law: Myth, Metaphor, and Authority, 77 TENN. L. REV.
883, 887-88 (2010) (citations omitted).
22. MEYER, supranote 12, at 75-76.
23. See Wayland & O'Brien, supra note 1, at 534 (discussing the fallacy of the position that
persons alleged to be "antisocial" are inhuman and cannot respond to treatment).
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constructed on such stereotypes is not only false, it is deadly. It renders
capital decision-makers unable "to perceive capital defendants as enough
like themselves to readily feel any of their pains, to appreciate the true
nature of the struggles they have faced, or to genuinely understand how
and why their lives have taken very different courses from the jurors'
own."2 4 Dr. Haney emphasizes the "central role of counter-narratives in
modem capital trial practice,, 25 explaining:
Absent such a mitigating counter-narrative, of course, most capital
jurors will have only the master crime narrative to fall back on. Its
familiar but often too simplistic assumptions about the nature of
violent crime will lead many of them to judge the defendant, and even
to condemn him to death, without ever coming to terms with who he is
or why. Mitigating counter-narratives are designed to counterbalance
26
and correct for this kind of truncated inquiry and decision making.
We agree with Dr. Haney that the defense narrative, constructed
upon a thorough life history investigation, is the best antidote to the
distorting effect of dehumanizing labels.
Unfortunately, defense lawyers often focus primarily on the battle
over diagnostic labels, and give insufficient attention to the client's
humanizing life story. We pointed out in our original article the available
science that supports challenges to the admissibility of opinion
testimony about the construct of psychopathy and related personality
disorders, and we suggested how defense counsel can use the fruits of2a7
comprehensive life history investigation to counter such evidence.
Counsel should always contest the admissibility of such evidence, and
object to the prosecution's use of experts who have a demonstrated bias
or financial interest in peddling ASPD diagnoses and the construct of
psychopathy to well-funded buyers.28 However, diligent efforts must be
made to prevent life-or-death decisions from deteriorating into a
"revolving door of experts" battling over which label best fits the
client.29 Labels do not humanize; they appeal to stereotype and create
false dichotomies; comorbid conditions are the rule rather than the
exception among capital defendants.3 °
24.

Haney, supranote 20, at 1558.

25.

Haney, Prison Violence, supra note 12, at 918.

26.
27.

Id.
See Wayland & O'Brien, supra note 1, at 539-42, 568-74.

28.

See id.
at 554-57.

29. Pinholster v. Ayers, 525 F.3d 742, 770 (9th Cir. 2008).
30. See, e.g., Ronald C. Kessler et al., Postiraumatic Stress Disorder in the National
Comorbidity Survey, 52 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 1048, 1058-59 (1995) (finding that the
presence of a second lifetime disorder is significantly elevated among people with lifetime posttraumatic stress disorder ("PTSD")); see also Kathleen Wayland, The Importance of Recognizing
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It is easy to find examples of courts rejecting mitigation
presentations that were based solely or mainly on diagnostic labels,
because the fight over verbiage failed to foster any understanding of the
defendant's humanity or his crime.31 In Pinholster v. Ayers,32 even
where there was no reason to question the credibility of the mental
health experts presented by counsel for Scott Pinholster to rebut a
pretrial opinion that he was antisocial, one court concluded "that no
newly-minted expert theory to explain his behavior would have made a
difference" in the face of Pinholster's behavior during the crime.33
Because other experts affixed different diagnostic labels, the court
concluded that it "[could not] believe the jury would have given it much
weight., 34 In Overstreet v. Wilson, 35 another capital defendant, Michael
Overstreet, was delusional and exhibited disorganized behavior and
speech before and during his trial.36 Three different mental health
experts agreed that he was mentally impaired, but disagreed as to the
diagnosis, and Overstreet was sentenced to death.37 While an appellate
court acknowledged there was "little doubt that on occasions Overstreet38
would have lacked the ability to evaluate his legal situation rationally,
the argument over diagnostic labels obscured the issue. The court
characterized counsel's argument as "harp[ing] on the theme that an
Axis I 'clinical disorder' is worse than an Axis II 'personality disorder'
and assert[ing that] the difference surely would have affected the jury. 3 9
The court disagreed: "[I]t was not clear to the state judiciary. . and is
not clear to us, that psychiatric terminology affects juries., 40 Further, the
fight over psychometric testing and diagnostic labels overshadowed
other mitigation evidence presented by Overstreet's lawyers. Dismissing
Trauma Throughout CapitalMitigation Investigations and Presentations,36 HOFSTRA L. REv. 923,

941-44 (2008).
31. See Robert J. Smith et al., The Failure of Mitigation?, 65 HASTINGS L.J. 1221, 1229-35
(2014).

32. 525 F.3d 742 (9th Cir. 2008).
33. Id. at 770.
34. Id. at 773 n.32.
35. 686 F.3d 404 (7th Cir. 2012).
36. Id. at 412 (Wood, J., dissenting).
37. Id. at 406, 408 (majority opinion).
38. Id. at 407.
39. Id. at 408. In fact, a few months after the court's decision, the multi-axial system on
which Overstreet's lawyers relied so heavily was abandoned. This highlights another serious
problem with placing the primary focus on shifting diagnostic labels and terminology. While health
care providers' descriptions of symptoms of impairment (hallucinations, delusions, disordered
thinking, hypervigilance, pressured speech, etc.) remain consistent over time, diagnostic labels may
change from one edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders ("DSM") to
the next.
40. Overstreet, 686 F.3d at 408.
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counsel's argument about the significance of the diagnostic mislabeling
as "say-so" and "lawyer talk," the court concluded that the mental
health claim "pale[d] beside" the battle of the experts that the court
focused on.41
The case of Wilson v. Trammel 42 is another good example of failed
advocacy over labels. Michael Wilson's trial expert relied primarily on
personality tests, such as the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality
Inventory-2 ("MMPI-2"), 43 to diagnose Wilson with a personality
disorder.44 Wilson's friends described his positive character traits, and
the trial expert interpreted psychometric testing to explain "the two
Michael Wilsons"-the one who committed a violent homicide, and the
one his family knew. 45 The prosecutor used computer-generated
personality test interpretations to suggest that Wilson had "the
characteristics of a psychopath."' 46 In post-conviction proceedings,
Wilson alleged that trial counsel overlooked testing data which indicated
the MMPI-2 score was invalid, and that he was, therefore, ineffective as
counsel for failing to have Wilson retake the test. 4 7 The hearing on

Wilson's claim was limited to the testimony of trial counsel and the trial
41. Id.at409-10.
42. 706 F.3d 1286 (10th Cir. 2013).
43. JAMES N. BUTCHER ET AL., MINNESOTA MULTIPHASIC PERSONALITY INVENTORY-2:
MANUAL FOR ADMINISTRATION, SCORING, AND INTERPRETATION 1-2,204-05 (rev. ed. 2001).
44. Wilson, 706 F.3d at 1290-91.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 1292. The computer-generated profile of Wilson's responses to the Millon Clinical
Multiaxial Inventory-Ill produced ammunition for damaging and misleading cross-examination in
which subjective traits, divorced from context necessary to an accurate, humanizing interpretation,
were presented as character deficiencies:
Dr. Reynolds conceded that the [Millon Clinical Multiaxial Inventory-Ill] interpretive
report stated that "[tlhe guiding principle of [Defendant] is to outwit others, exerting
power over them before they can exploit him," and that Defendant was "easily
provoked" and "may express sudden and unanticipated brutality,".... He also
acknowledged that Defendant had responded "True" to the following statements on the
test questionnaire: "Lately, I have begun to feel like smashing things"; "I often get angry
with people who do things slowly"; "I have had to be really rough with some people to
keep them in line"; and "Isometimes feel crazy-like or unreal when things start to go
badly in my life."
Id. (citations omitted). Personality testing instruments are loaded with questions that force a
defendant to choose answers that will make him vulnerable to such cross-examination by the
prosecutor no matter how he responds. See id. at 1290. Personality tests produce "computerized
narratives [which] have been criticized as lacking validity, being devoid of social history context,
inaccurate and misleading, and often false." George Woods et al., NeurobehavioralAssessment in
Forensic Practice, 35 INT'L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 432, 435 (2012). Experienced capital defense
lawyers do not use personality testing because "[t]hese tests do not help to explain a client's life or
experiences in an effective way, and there is a high risk that statements endorsed in the test will be
taken out of context to portray the individual negatively, and that long-standing symptoms can be
misjudged to reflect personality traits rather than neurodevelopmental disorders." Id
47. Wilson, 706 F.3d at 1293.
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mental health expert.4 8 The psychologist testified that his testing failed to
reveal Wilson's history of auditory hallucinations, and that with more
accurate test results, he would have considered a broader range of
diagnoses, including bipolar disorder and schizophrenia; he ultimately
settled upon a diagnosis that the court described as "schizophrenic
paranoid personality disorder." 9 The issue of life or death turned on the
Tenth Circuit's lengthy discussion parsing Wilson's performance on
personality testing instruments, and the range of conflicting diagnostic
interpretations that were possible. 50 After considering the ways in which
each party could spin the test results, the Court of Appeals concluded
that the "[d]efendant would have been no better off with the evidence
presented at the hearing, and in significant ways would have been worse
off."'" Such are the fruits of engaging in a battle of the experts; Wilson's
humanity was obscured by generic interpretations of computer-scored
personality testing.
In none of these cases did the mental health evidence advance the
decision-maker's ability to view the accused as a unique, complex
human being, struggling with the burdens of severe mental and
emotional impairments--even though that is a true description of all
three defendants. In Pinholster and Overstreet, the record established
that the postconviction experts' findings were supported by far more
complete and reliable social history evidence than were the opinions of
the trial experts.52 In Wilson, the postconviction case rested on the trial
expert's re-interpretation of personality testing.53 On paper, the data
favored the findings of the postconviction experts in all three cases. Yet,
in none of the cases was the decision-maker moved to spare the
defendant's life. The difference between counsel's failure in these cases,
and the successes discussed in Part III, lies in the inability of diagnostic
labels, brain imaging data, or psychological testing instruments to
communicate the client's unique and complex humanity.54 To be
accessible to capital case decision-makers, the client's mental and
cognitive impairments must be revealed in the context of his humanizing
life story.55
48. Id.at 1294.
49. Id.at 1294-95. This is not a diagnosis found in the DSM.
50. Id. at 1307-10.
51. Id. at 1307.
52. See Overstreet v. Wilson, 686 F.3d 404, 413-17 (7th Cir. 2012) (Wood, J., dissenting);
Pinholster v. Ayers, 525 F.3d 742, 778-82 (9th Cir. 2008) (Fisher, J.,dissenting); supra text
accompanying note 31.
53. See supra text accompanying notes 44-46.
54. See supra text accompanying notes 25-29; infra Part 11I.
55. See infra Part 111.Judge Kozinsky criticized performance standards under which "any trial
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COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY, NARRATIVE, AND
LIFE-OR-DEATH DECISIONS

"When men wish to56construct or support a theory, how they torture

facts into their service! ,

- Charles Mackey, Memoirs of Extraordinary Popular Delusions
and the Madness of Crowds
Capital defense performance standards emphasize the importance
of developing and presenting a narrative of the client's life history,
because it is essential to make the mitigation case accessible to the
decision-making process of judges and juries. Cognitive psychologists
use the term confirmation bias to explain the complexity of an
individual's opinions and decision-making: when people are confronted
with facts that contradict deeply held beliefs, they will find ways to
discount the new evidence and cling more strongly to those beliefs. 7
Moreover, "[c]onfirmation bias ...connotes the seeking or interpreting
of evidence in ways that are partial to existing beliefs, expectations, or a
hypothesis in hand."5 8 It does not always occur on a conscious level;
lawyer who fails to worship at the altar of 'humanization' will be labeled an incompetent boob."
Pinholster v. Ayers, 590 F.3d 651, 692 (9th Cir. 2009) (Kozinsky, J.,dissenting), rev'd sub nom.
Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388 (2011). But Judge Kozinsky's limited perspective is
misguided. He finds his data for performance standards in cases where superficial mitigation
presentations similar to that of Pinholster's trial lawyer resulted in death verdicts. Id.at 707 (citing
generally People v. Cooper, 809 P.2d 865 (Cal. 1991); In re Visciotti, 926 P.2d 987 (Cal. 1996)).
Dr. Haney points out:
[G]iven the fact that the appellate court reviews the penalty records of only those cases
in which death verdicts were rendered, there is no reason to believe that judges have any
special expertise or range of experience in reaching conclusions about how background
and social history actually affect the life course of a capital defendant, or the way in
which evidence about these factors can influence the decisionmaking of (especially) lifesentencing capital jurors. Appellate courts are in need of education about both, otherwise
their judgments may approximate those of lay persons, threatened by stereotypes and
misconceptions, but absent any meaningful exposure to powerful penalty phase evidence
designed to challenge or counterbalance them.
Haney, Social Context, supra note 12, at 606-07. Judge Kozinsky's reasoning is analogous to the
medical field drawing performance standards almost exclusively from cases in which the patient
died. See Russell Stetler & W. Bradley Wendel, The ABA Guidelines and the Norms of Capital
Defense Representation, 41 HOFSTRA L. REv. 635, 676-81 (2013) (discussing the implications of
the fact that appellate courts never see capital cases in which the defendant avoids the death
penalty).
56. CHARLES MACKEY, MEMOIRS OF EXTRAORDINARY POPULAR DELUSIONS AND THE
MADNESS OF CROWDS 552 (2d ed. 1852), available at http://www.econlib.org/library/Mackay/
macExl 0.html#.
57. Raymond S. Nickerson, Confirmation Bias: A Ubiquitous Phenomenon in Many Guises, 2
REV. GEN. PSYCHOL. 175, 197 (1998).
58. Id.at 175. Political commentators, social scientists, and legal scholars have observed and
written extensively on this phenomenon. See, e.g., NAOMI CAHN & JUNE CARBONE, RED FAMILIES
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confirmation bias "refers usually to unwitting selectivity in the
acquisition and use of evidence."5 9 However, "[m]otivated confirmation
bias has long been believed by philosophers to be an important
determinant of thought and behavior., 60 That such bias exists is wellsupported by the evidence:
A great deal of empirical evidence supports the idea that the
confirmation bias is extensive and strong and that it appears in many
guises. The evidence also supports the view that once one has taken a
position on an issue, one's primary purpose becomes that of defending
or justifying that position ... regardless of whether one's treatment of
evidence was evenhanded
before the stand was taken, it can become
61
highly biased afterward.

In short, people readily accept information that is consistent with
their world view, and reject that which is not. George Lakoff cautions
that merely marshaling facts to attack an accepted narrative only
reinforces the false belief.62 This is true across the political spectrum,
and it is equally true in other aspects of human endeavor,63 including
decision-making in capital cases by jurors and judges chosen for service
v. BLUE FAMILIES: LEGAL POLARIZATION AND THE CREATION OF CULTURE 65 (2010); GEORGE

LAKOFF, DON'T THINK OF AN ELEPHANT!: KNOW YOUR VALUES AND FRAME THE DEBATE 17
(2004); SHAWN W. ROSENBERG, REASON, IDEOLOGY AND POLITICS 15 (1988). For example, this

phenomenon has been used to explain the belief of many Americans that Saddam Hussein was
responsible for the September 11,2001 attack on the World Trade Center even after the report of
the 9/11 Commission proved this belief is false. LAKOFF, supra, at 18. George Lakoff hypothesizes
that this is the effect of skillfully deployed narrative designed to appeal to preconceived biases and
prejudices. Id. at 71-74.
59. Nickerson, supra note 57, at 175.
60. Id. at 176 (emphasis added). Raymond S.Nickerson quotes Francis Bacon's description of
this phenomenon nearly four centuries ago:
The human understanding when it has once adopted an opinion .. . draws all things else
to support and agree with it. And though there be a greater number and weight of
instances to be found on the other side, yet these it either neglects and despises, or else
by some distinction sets aside and rejects; in order that by this great and pernicious
predetermination the authority of its former conclusions may remain inviolate.
Id. (quoting Francis Bacon, Novum Organum, in THE ENGLISH PHILOSOPHERS FROM BACON TO
MILL 24, 36 (Edwin A. Burt ed., 1939)).
61. Id. at 177.
62. "The facts alone will not set us free. People make decisions about politics and candidates
based on their value system, and the language and frames that invoke those values." LAKOFF, supra
note 58, at xiii.
63. See CAHN & CARBONE, supra note 58, at 64-65 (discussing the use of metaphor in
political messaging to reinforce deeply held beliefs regarding issues involving homosexuality and
family structure). Additionally, "[s]uch beliefs are resistant to argument, logic, or facts. Indeed,
cultural research suggests that when empirical data conflict with these beliefs, people reinterpret or
deny the empirical findings rather than change their views." Id. at 65 (footnotes omitted); see also
Donald Braman et al., Modeling Facts, Culture, and Cognition in the Gun Debate, 18 SOC. JUST.
RES. 283, 292-94 (2005).
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based on their support for capital punishment. 64 This is the phenomenon
at play when defense lawyers attack prejudicial psychiatric labels solely
with counter-labels and psychometric testing.
The CJP has identified several ways that implicit bias affects the
decision-making

of jurors

who

sit

on

capital

cases. 65

Juror

demographics, including race, influence their attitudes toward mercy and
66
their perceptions of whether the defendant is dangerous or remorseful.
Factors that operate to define the defendant as "Other" have an
aggravating, dehumanizing effect,67 and the influence of race is
particularly pernicious. 68 As we explained in our original article,
testimony describing the accused as "antisocial" or "psychopathic" plays
into multiple aggravating stereotypes that the accused is remorseless,
cunning, manipulative, dangerous, and completely self-centered-maybe
even inhuman.69 We also discussed many of the problems and
controversies with ASPD and the construct of psychopathy, and
64. A capital case jury is selected by eliminating people whose views on the death penalty
substantially impair their willingness to impose the death penalty. Although the Supreme Court has
upheld the procedure, research demonstrating the biasing effect of death qualification of juries is
persuasive. See Grigsby v. Mabry, 758 F.2d 226, 232-38 (8th Cir. 1985), rev'd, Lockhart v.
McCree, 476 U.S. 162 (1986). The judicial selection process may also filter out candidates who do
not support capital punishment. See William M. Bowen, A Former Alabama Appellate Judge's
Perspective on the Mitigation Function in Capital Cases, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 805, 807 (2008)
("The reality is that the death penalty is so political in Alabama that as a practical matter, if you are
against the death penalty, you cannot get elected as a judge or any other public official. Once
elected, your rulings must reflect your bias for death."); Stephen B. Bright & Patrick J. Keenan,
Judges and the Politics of Death: Deciding Between the Bill of Rights and the Next Election in
Capital Cases, 75 B.U. L. REV. 759, 776-92 (1995).
65. See John H. Blume et al., Competent Capital Representation. The Necessity of Knowing
and Heeding What Jurors Tell Us About Mitigation, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1035, 1056-57 (2008).
66. See id at 1057 (discussing CJP data reflecting that in cases involving black defendants,
African-American male jurors are more likely than their white counterparts "to see the defendant as
remorseful, to believe that the defendant's background had adversely influenced his life, to have
lingering doubts about the defendant's role in the crime, and to believe that the defendant did not
pose a future danger if given a life sentence").
67. Haney, Social Context, supra note 12, at 548-59. Dr. Haney explains that painting a
"distorted, exaggerated, and mythologized" picture of the defendant "not only makes it easier to kill
them but also to distance ourselves from any sense of responsibility for the roots of the problem
itself. If violent crime is the product of monstrous offenders, then our only responsibility is to find
and eliminate them." Id. at 558.
68. Empirical research suggests "that in cases involving a Black defendant and a White
victim-cases in which the likelihood of the death penalty is already high-jurors are influenced
not simply by the knowledge that the defendant is Black, but also by the extent to which the
defendant appears stereotypically Black." Jennifer L. Eberhardt et al., Looking Deathworthy:
Perceived Stereotypicality of Black Defendants Predicts Capital-Sentencing Outcomes, 17
PSYCHOL. ScI. 383, 385 (2006). See generally MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS
INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS (2010) (discussing the relationship between

racially discriminatory law enforcement practices and America's historically unprecedented
incarceration rate).
69. See Wayland & O'Brien, supra note 1, at 524-31.
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provided the scientific and research framework for challenging the
reliability and admissibility
of such evidence based on its subjectivity
70
and unreliability.
The universal stigma of psychiatric and cognitive disabilities attests
to the powerful negative perceptions and stereotypes associated with
mental illness. Indeed, prosecutors throw the term "psychopath" into
capital trials to activate the archetype that it evokes in the jurors'
imaginations.71 The use of labels to describe a person on trial for his life
invites decision-makers to fill the gaps in information with popular
culture stereotypes of violent criminals. When the client is branded
"antisocial," prosecutors are empowered to call the defendant namesmonster, animal, psychopath, maniac-and thereby deny the defendant
individualized consideration of his human dignity and individuality. 72 In
his place, a false and misleading one-dimensional archetypal character is
built, whose downfall Hollywood has conditioned us to savor.
Cognitive psychologists tell us that an appeal to the jury's intellect
and reason with carefully researched factual information about mental
disease and cognitive disorders may have the opposite effect; it may
drive jurors to cling more strongly to their preconceived stereotypes of
expert witnesses and violent criminals. The client's fate then hangs on
the proverbial "battle of the experts" that glazes the eyes of most judges
and juries. 73 When CJP researchers asked capital jurors if either party
called a witness they felt "backfir[ed]" or was "hard to believe," twothirds of them identified mental health experts, who were perceived to be
hired guns for the defense.74 This explains CJP data indicating that when
the defense relies on expert testimony to carry the core of its mitigation
70. Id. at 532-66.
71. In one recent study, researchers asked 203 undergraduate students to review a capital case
in which "the results of the defendant's psychological examination were experimentally
manipulated." John F. Edens et al., The Impact of Mental Health Evidence on Supportfor Capital

Punishment: Are Defendants Labeled Psychopathic Considered More Deserving of Death?, 23
BEHAV. Sci. & L. 603, 603 (2005). Where the expert testified that the defendant was psychopathic,
participants were much more likely to support a death sentence (60%) than when he was found to be
psychotic (30%) or not mentally disordered (38%). Id. Although "psychotic" defendants fared much
better than psychopathic defendants in John F. Edens' research, mental illness triggers negative
associations with lay people. Sadler et al., supra note 14, at 916-17.
72. Haney, Social Context, supra note 12, at 558-59; Wayland & O'Brien, supra note 1, at
525-27.
73. See, e.g., Wilson v. Trammell, 706 F.3d 1286, 1290-1304 (10th Cir. 2013) (involving
expert battles over psychiatric labels); Overstreet v. Wilson, 686 F.3d 404, 412-13 (7th Cir. 2012)
(Wood, J., dissenting). The fact that the client is afflicted with delusional thinking unconnected with
reality is far more important than whether the delusions are a product of schizophrenia, bipolar
disorder, major depression with psychotic features, or PTSD.
74. Scott E. Sundby, The Jury as Critic: An EmpiricalLook at How CapitalJuries Perceive
Expert and Lay Testimony, 83 VA. L. REv. 1109,1123, 1126-30 (1997).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2015

13

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 43, Iss. 3 [2015], Art. 6

HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43:751

case, juries tend to reject it; only when "the expert takes the role of
accompanist and helps harmoniously explain, integrate, and provide
context to evidence presented by others, the jury is far more likely to
find the expert's testimony ...to be trusted. ' 5
Juror suspicion of mental health experts shows up in the CJP data
in multiple ways. Jurors are more likely to be persuaded by "lay
experts," e.g., teachers, healthcare providers, counselors, or social
workers, who know the client, and who can testify about his human
struggles with internal impairments and life circumstances.76 A juror's
belief that the defendant loves his family adds to their sense that he is
capable of remorse, and also correlates favorably with a vote for life.77
All of these findings demonstrate the impact of thorough mitigation
investigations and presentations that portray the client as a unique,
complex human being-the antithesis of anti-social personality disorder.
This is what we meant when we said that when a client is labeled
"antisocial," the investigation, not the client, is shallow and superficial.78
Decades of research in social and cognitive psychology, augmented
by recent findings from neuroscience, provide a useful framework and
vocabulary for analyzing how individuals (including police officers,
attorneys, jurors, and judges) may differentially perceive and interpret
the information presented to them during criminal justice proceedings
and capital trials. The field of cognitive psychology was heavily
influenced by Jean Piaget's seminal work on cognitive development,
which focused on critical processes for the development and integration
of knowledge. 79 Embedded in Piaget's theory is the construct of schema,
an organized pattern of thought or behavior, a structured cluster of
preconceived ideas, a mental framework to organize social information,
and assumptions used to interpret and process new information.8 °

75. Id.at 1144.
76. Melissa E. Whitman, Communicating with Capital Juries: How Life Versus Death
Decisions Are Made, What Persuades,and How to Most Effectively Communicate the Need for a
Verdict ofLife, 11 CAP. DEF. J. 263, 278-79 (1999).
77. See Theodore Eisenberg et al., But Was He Sorry? The Role of Remorse in Capital
Sentencing, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1599, 1621 (1998) (finding a high correlation between jurors'
beliefs that the defendant was sorry for his crime and that he loved his family). It has been noted
that "[]urors perhaps think that defendants who are capable of showing love to their families also
have the capacity to experience remorse." Id. Jurors who perceive the defendant as remorseful are
less likely to vote for death. Stephen P. Garvey, Aggravation and Mitigationin CapitalCases: What
Do Jurors Think?, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1538, 1559 tbl.4, 1560-61 (1998).
78. Wayland & O'Brien, supra note 1, at 531 & nn.74-75.
79. See generally JEAN PIAGET, THE ORIGINS OF INTELLIGENCE INCHILDREN (Margaret Cook
trans., 1952).
80. See id.
at 174-84; see also HERBERT P. GINSBURG & SYLVIA OPPER, PIAGET'S THEORY OF
INTELLECTUAL DEVELOPMENT 19-22 (3d ed. 1988).
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The importance of this research in a capital litigation context is that
jurors and judges do not enter the courtroom with a neutral frame of
reference with respect to the defendant and the violent crime with which
he is charged. Each brings his own schema through which the evidence
will be interpreted; this schema fills in gaps in data by providing
explanations that go beyond the absorbed information. 81 Developing a
template for processing information about the world enables us to
quickly analyze and respond to new situations. However, a decisionmaker's schema may include faulty notions regarding the cause-andeffect of violent behavior, mental health and cognitive development, the
deleterious effects of trauma, or even racial stereotypes that generate
erroneous conclusions.82 Professors Anthony G. Amsterdam and Jerome
Bruner explain:
Nobody has the time or mental energy to deal with everything
encountered as if it were unique, for thefirst time. So we use the past
to manage the present. We need to be able to say, as William James
put it, "here comes a thingumabob again." Another way to put
it is that categorization minimizes surprise, allows us to treat things as
ifthey were the same as what we had encountered before. It
ensures that the limited number of slots we have for processing
what is going on around
us are used to good purpose, not wasted on
83
lavish particularity.
Therefore, our world view is organized into "cognitive 'shortcuts'
that transform unfamiliar situations into events that are within an
individual's range of experience. 84 Human beings interpret sensory
perceptions in relation to schema, or "interpretive frameworks," that
"constantly 'filter and affect' what an individual "should be seeing and
feeling in a given situation.8S
It is the process of filling in gaps in knowledge that leads to trouble
for criminal defendants. As Amsterdam and Bruner point out, "[t]he

81. See Richard K. Sherwin, The Narrative Construction of Legal Reality, 18 VT. L. REV.
681, 700-01 (1994).
82. See id at700 & n.60, 701-04.
83. AMSTERDAM & BRUNER, supra note 12, at 21 (footnotes omitted). For popular culture
discussions of this phenomenon, compare MALCOLM GLADWELL, BLINK: THE POWER OF THINKING
WITHOUT THINKING 136-45 (2005) (suggesting that these neurological shortcuts save us from the
dilemma of an information overload or analysis paralysis), with MICHAEL R. LEGAULT, TH!NK:
WHY CRUCIAL DECISIONS CAN'T BE MADE IN THE BLINK OF AN EYE 1-14 (2006) (criticizing
Gladwell's suggestion that snap judgments are no substitutes for critical thinking).
84. Jennifer Sheppard, Once Upon a Time, Happily Ever After, and in a Galaxy Far,Far
Away: Using Narrative to Fill the Cognitive Gap Left by Overrelianceon PureLogic in Appellate
Briefs and Motion Memoranda, 46 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 255, 259 (2009).
85. Id. at 259-60.
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burden of this new work in the human sciences, to oversimplify a bit, is
that categories are made in the mind and not found in the world," which
raises questions: "Why do we create our categories as we do, justify
them in what are often very odd ways, and put things into them or not by
what are often dubious procedures? How can categorizing lead us into
trouble and error? ' 86 An incomplete mitigation presentation invites this
process, with potentially fatal result; gaps in decision-makers'
knowledge about the client will be filled with images drawn from
categories-stereotypes-that reside in their own schemata.
Research in cognitive psychology and neuroscience provides
insights about how this preexisting interpretive framework shapes
perceptions, conclusions, and behavior in the criminal justice setting,
causing individual police officers, attorneys, jurors, and judges to
perceive and interpret differently the information presented to them.
Within this body of research is the rubric of "implicit social cognition,"
which refers to biases, attitudes, and stereotypes that operate without
intentional control, and at a level below cognitive awareness.87 Early
research focused on measures of "explicit racial bias," stereotypes, or
beliefs that are endorsed on a conscious level.88 As awareness grew
about the role of social desirability and impression management in the
study of explicit racial bias, these measures were increasingly questioned
for their ability to shed light on issues related to racial and other biases.
This led to new methods of studying bias, and gave rise to the study of
implicit social bias. Research indicates that these hidden "implicit"
biases are "robust and pervasive," and can influence the way we
perceive and behave, even when individuals are committed to being fair
and objective.89
86. AMSTERDAM & BRUNER, supranote 12, at 9-10.
87. See, e.g., Helping Courts Address Implicit Bias: Resourcesfor Education, NAT'L CENTER
ST. CTS., http://www.ncsc.org/ibeducation (last visited Apr. 12, 2015); see also CHERYL STAATS,
KIRWAN INST. FOR THE STUDY OF RACE AND ETHINICITY, STATE OF THE SCIENCE: IMPLICIT BIAS
REvIEW 2013, at 6, 11-12 (2013) [hereinafter STAATS, IMPLICIT BIAS 2013], available at
http://kirwaninstitute.osu.edu/docs/SOTS-ImplicitBias.pdf. The Kirwan Institute's 2014 report is
also available online. CHERYL STAATS, KIRWAN INST. FOR THE STUDY OF RACE AND
ETHNICITY, STATE OF THE SCIENCE: IMPLICIT BIAS REvIEw 2014 (2014), available at

http://kirwaninstitute.osu.edu/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/2014-implicit-bias.pdf Implicit bias has
been studied in numerous ways, including: physiological approaches; priming methods; response
latency measures; and the Implicit Association Test. See STAATS, IMPLICIT BIAS 2013, supra, at 2128 (discussing these methods and relevant findings). For example, functional Magnetic Resonance
Imaging has been used to study the amygdala, the part of the brain that reacts to threat and fear, and

which has a "known role in race-related mental processes." Id at 22 (citation omitted). Several
studies have shown that Caucasian subjects in general show greater amygdala activation when
exposed to unfamiliar African-American faces as opposed to unfamiliar Caucasian faces. Id.
88.

See STAATS, IMPLICIT BIAS 2013, supra note 87, at 13-15.

89. Id. at 7-8.
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Race may compound the prejudicial effect of psychiatric labels.
Substantial research establishes the existence of implicit bias on the part
of police, 90 judges, 91 prosecuting attorneys,9 2 defense lawyers,93 jurors,94
and physicians. 95 It is difficult to imagine that implicit racial bias does
not come into play when the defendant is labeled "antisocial" or
"psychopathic. 9 6 Our original article discussed substantial research
establishing the existence of examiner bias in the interpretation of the
Psychopathy Checklist-Revised ("PCL-R"), although race was not a
90. In one study, officers were shown pictures of white and black faces, and with no
additional information were asked, "Who looks criminal?" The results established that race played a
significant role in officers' judgments:
When officers were given no information other than a face and when they were
explicitly directed to make judgments of criminality, race played a significant role in
how those judgments were made. Black faces looked more criminal to police officers;
the more Black, the more criminal. These results provide additional evidence that police
officers associate Blacks with the specific concept of crime.
Jennifer L. Eberhardt et al., Seeing Black: Race, Crime, and Visual Processing,87 J. PERSONALITY
& SOC. PSYCHOL. 876, 888-89 (2004). Other studies confirm a "shooter/weapons bias," which
"refers to the strong and pervasive implicit association between Blackness ... and weapons." which
can mean life or death for innocent Black citizens. STAATS, IMPLICIT BIAS 2013, supra note 87, at
37-38.
91. STAATS, IMPLICIT BIAS 2013, supra note 87, at 39 ("Even with an avowed commitment to
impartiality, judges, like the rest of the general population, display implicit [racial] biases."). Judges
may have an "illusion of objectivity," meaning they tend to be overconfident of their ability to avoid
racial prejudice in decision-making. Id. at 39-40.
92. Cheryl Staats explains the impact of implicit bias on prosecutors:
Prosecutors are as susceptible to implicit racial biases as anyone else, and the unique
nature of their job provides numerous opportunities for those biases to act within
criminal justice proceedings .... These choices can have tremendous impacts on
suspects' lives, particularly when prosecutors are deciding between trying someone in
juvenile court vs. adult court, or determining whether to pursue the death penalty.
[P]rosecutorial implicit biases can crop up during aspects of trial strategy, such as jury
selection and closing arguments. During closing arguments, in particular, prosecutors
may activate implicit biases by referring to the accused in terms that dehumanize them,
such as using animal imagery.
Id. at 43-44.
93. Defense attorneys' implicit bias can adversely affect their performance in a number of
areas, including jury selection and the quality of the attorney-client relationship. Id. at 45.
94. Research indicates that jurors tend to show biases against defendants of a different race,
and that racial composition of juries has a considerable impact on legal decisions. Id. at 40-42. As
racial issues are at the heart of many capital trials, this points to the importance of defense attorneys
carefully considering the ramifications of racial issues in multiple aspects of capital litigation.
95. Research into the implicit racial biases of physicians found "implicit and explicit attitudes
about race align well with the patterns found in large heterogeneous samples of the general
population, as most doctors implicitly preferred Whites to Blacks." Id. at 47.
96. Researchers suggest that additional studies are needed "to further explore how the
construct of psychopathy as assessed by the [Psychopathy Checklist-Revised] fits with different
cultural conceptualizations of mental illness and criminality," as most extant research addresses
European populations. Elizabeth A. Sullivan & David S. Kosson, Ethnic & Cultural Variations in
Psychopathy, in CHRISTOPHER J. PATRICK, HANDBOOK OF PSYCHOPATHY 439 (2006).
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factor addressed in most of those studies. 97 In addition to the issue of
examiner bias, experimental evidence supports concerns that jurors are
more likely to perceive a black defendant as having "antisocial" or
"psychopathic" traits. 9 Given the powerful and pervasive effect of
implicit racial bias, the use of prejudicial psychiatric labels to a minority
defendant is especially dangerous.
The danger, of course, is that the reliability and fairness of life-ordeath decisions are undermined by the preexisting implicit bias inherent
in each juror's schema. Professors Amsterdam and Bruner observe:
"[W]e are always at risk that our categories may lead us astray.
Indispensable instruments, they are also inevitable beguilers." 99 They
have commented on this trait:
[It has spawned] a collective way of thought disposed to all-or-none
judgments, to sharp polarization, to defining the Other as simply nonUs, to defining Us as non-Them. It renders us insensitive to middle
grounds and the subtle qualities of Others. We Americans find it
peculiarly hard to appreciate mitigating circumstances, peculiarly
tempting to cast blame rather than find explanation. Put them in jail,
one-two-three out, for-us or against-us! This turn of collective thought
reflects itself, we suspect, in resistance to affirmative action, in our
reluctance to carry the American Creed "too far," in unwillingness to
abolish the death penalty, and above all, in our
stumbling efforts to
00
come to terms with our racism-Them and Us.1

A significant body of cognitive science confirms this is so:
Most commentators, by far, have seen the confirmation bias as a
human failing, a tendency that is at once pervasive and irrational. It is
not difficult to make a case for this position. The bias can contribute to

97. See Wayland & O'Brien, supra note 1, at 554-58. Although the issue of racial bias in the
context of expert testimony on ASPD and psychopathy has not been well researched, available
research suggests there are important differences in the performance of African Americans and
Caucasians on the PCL-R, and that certain PCL-R items appear to be particularly subject to race
bias. David Freedman, PrematureReliance on the Psychopathy Checklist-Revised in Violence Risk
and Threat Assessment, J. THREAT ASSESSMENT, 2001, at 53, 58-59.
98. For example, in mock jury studies of racial influence on juries, Caucasian jurors have
shown a tendency to rate African-American defendants as "more aggressive, less honest and moral,
more likely to reoffend, and more likely to have a 'criminal personality type' than Caucasian
defendants. To the extent that minority defendants also are 'diagnosed' as psychopathic by an expert
witness, it seems plausible that this bias might be magnified." John F. Edens et al., Psychopathyand
the Death Penalty: Can the Psychopathy Checklist-Revised Identify Offenders Who Represent "a
Continuing Threat to Society"?, 29 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 433, 461 (2001) (citing Samuel R.
Sommers & Phoebe C. Ellsworth, White Juror Bias: An Investigation of PrejudiceAgainst Black
Defendants in the American Courtroom, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 201, 212-13 (2001)).
99. AMsTERDAM & BRUNER, supra note 12, at 19.
100. Id. at 16.
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delusions of many sorts, to the development and survival of
superstitions, and to a variety of undesirable states of mind, including
paranoia and depression. It can be exploited to great advantage by
seers, soothsayers, fortune tellers, and indeed anyone with an
inclination to press unsubstantiated claims. One can also imagine it
and strife
playing a significant role in the perpetuation of animosities
10 1
between people with conflicting views of the world.
Testimony which purports to be science-based and labels the client
as "antisocial" or "psychopathic" appeals102to the fictitious popular culture
stereotype of the dangerous psychopath.
Fighting such evidence with a counter-label, rather than a counternarrative, is not likely to be successful. Labels appeal to stereotype:
Once we put a creature, thing, or situation in a category, we will
attribute to it the features of that category and fail to see the features of
it that don't fit. We will miss the opportunities that might have existed
in all the alternative categories we did not use. We will see distinctions
and ignore differences because we
where there may be no10 differences
3
fail to see distinctions.
Thus, psychiatric labels do not communicate the client's innate
uniqueness and complexity, nor do they reveal the things that would
enable the jury to see him as like themselves-a human being with
hopes, dreams, beliefs, and values, in many ways similar to their own.
When applied to a person accused of a violent crime, labels inspire
severe punishment, not mercy:
Historically, the depiction of criminals as defective has always
facilitated their mistreatment at the hands of the criminal justice
system, and the more "scientifically" the defect could be documented,
the greater the mistreatment. Thus, the easier it is to derogate
defendants, the easier it is to treat them harshly. Both sides of this
dynamic help to explain the American public's fixation with the
potential biological and genetic basis of criminality: The belief that
and therefore different facilitates society's
criminals are born defective
04
harsh treatment of them.1

101. Nickerson, supra note 57, at 205.
102. Wayland & O'Brien, supra note 1, at 525-26.
103. AMsTERDAM & BRUNER, supranote 12, at 49.
104. Haney, supra note 4, at 1461-62. Dr. Haney explains that "jurors can morally disengage
from the defendant by substituting the disorder for the person." Id. at 1464 n.84. Dr. Haney provides
that the most "extreme example" of prejudicial labeling
occurs when prosecutors encourage jurors to substitute an ."antisocial personality" for the
personhood of the defendant, robbing him of many human qualities with which jurors
might otherwise identify and instead putting in their place a host of diabolical traits that
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The structure of a capital trial facilitates the dehumanization of the
defendant. In the guilt-or-innocence stage of the trial, a defense
restricted to narrowly-defined statutory criteria for insanity or
diminished mental capacity "requires extensive reliance on psychiatric
opinion and the corresponding use of medical terminology and
diagnostic labels. Yet, this kind of labeling can reduce
very complicated
' 10 5
human beings to disembodied psychiatric categories."
At best, a battle of the experts over psychiatric labels simply
substitutes one stereotype for another-switching the juror's image of
the capital defendant from Hannibal Lector (from Silence of the Lambs),
to Norman Bates (from the movie Psycho)0 6 is not likely to engender
sufficient empathy to motivate her to reject the death penalty. Instead,
"the starting point for compassionate justice becomes the recognition of
basic human commonality-an opportunity for capital jurors to connect
themselves to the experiences, moral dilemmas, and human tragedies
faced by the defendant."' 10 7 This is not accomplished with the charts,
graphs, and images developed through psychometric testing and medical
imaging; decision-makers respond to narrative in a fundamentally
different way. In describing narratives, they tend to "cohere differently,
not through the mechanics and chemistry of cause and effect but through
the play of human intentions and purposeful acts in the worlds of
striving, accomplishment and failure, victory and defeat."' 1 8 We can
typically imply, without benefit of proof, an evil "inner self' that extends far beyond any
overt behavior.
Id.
105. Id. Dr. Haney's observation helps explain why "[l]awsuit stories often suffer from their
close association with lawyers. Many lawyers cannot help but choke the humanity out of a story by
reducing it to its legal essentials." Michael N. Burt, The Importance of Storytelling at All Stages of a
Capital Case, 77 UMKC L. REV. 877, 900 (2009) (quoting Gerald Reading Powell, Opening
Statements: The Art of Storytelling, 31 STETSON L. REv. 89, 92 (2001)).
106. PSYCHO (Paramount Pictures 1960).
107. Haney, supra note 4, at 1465.
108. AMSTERDAM & BRUNER, supra note 12, at 12. Cognitive scientists explain that "[o]n the
one hand, the person incorporates or assimilates features of external reality into his own
psychological structures; on the other hand, he modifies or accommodates his psychological
structures to meet the pressures of the environment." GINSBURG & OPPER, supra note 80, at 18.
Piaget explained that:
Intelligence is assimilation to the extent that it incorporates all the given data of
experience within its framework ..... Assimilation can never be pure because by
incorporating new elements into its earlier schemata the intelligence constantly modifies
the latter in order to adjust them to new elements. Conversely, things are never known by
themselves, since this work of accommodation is only possible as a function of the
inverse process of assimilation.
PIAGET, supra note 79, at 6-7. Narrative is the medium by which jurors can respond to mitigation
evidence by assimilating the new and different information about a capital defendant into their
schemata, and by expanding or altering their schemata to accommodate it.
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inundate the jury with logic and scientific facts about mental illness and
human behavior, and proper diagnostic procedure and terminology, but
without knowing the story of the defendant's life, decision-makers
cannot arrive at an empathetic understanding of him or his crime.
Narratives, or stories, serve as an interpretive framework in which
multiple schemata are operating at once. Humans have a "predisposition
to organize experience into a narrative form;" in fact, "this
predisposition toward narrative is ...as natural to human
comprehension of the world as [an individual's] visual rendering of what
the eye sees ....
,,"109
Consequently, narrative form is "an innate schema
for the organization and [understanding of human] experience."110
Because humans learn by interacting with their environment, they
understand concepts expressed in the form of stories better
than they understand abstract principles. Thus, narratives are
"central to [an individual's] ability to make sense out of a series of
chronological events."''
Only through exhaustive life history investigation can the stories
and storytellers of the client's life be discovered. Our emphasis on the
central importance of narrative in addition to science is consistent with
Justice Brennan's observation regarding the origin of the long-term trend
toward moderation in criminal punishment:
[B]eliefs in the personal value and dignity of the common man that
were born of the democratic movement of the eighteenth century, as
well as beliefs in the scientific approach to an understanding
of the motive forces of human conduct, which are the result of
the growth of the sciences of behavior during the nineteenth and
twentieth centuries. 112
Capital defense attorneys, wherever possible, rely on lay witnesses, lay
experts, and documentary and demonstrative evidence, in addition to
expert witnesses, who can tell the jury a truthful narrative of the
defendant's life that explains his mental impairments, disorders, or
limitations, as well as his hopes, accomplishments, and failures in the
context of his humanity. 113

109. J. Christopher Rideout, Storytelling, Narrative Rationality, and Legal Persuasion, 14 J.
LEGAL WRITING INST. 53, 57-58 (2008) (citing JEROME BRUNER, ACTS OF MEANING 45 (1990)).
110. Id. at 58 (citation omitted).
I11. Sheppard, supra note 84, at 261 (citation omitted).
112. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 296 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring) (quoting
THORSTEN SELLIN, THE DEATH PENALTY, A REPORT FOR THE MODEL PENAL CODE PROJECT OF
THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE 15 (1959)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
113. WELSH S. WHITE, LITIGATING IN THE SHADOW OF DEATH: DEFENSE ATTORNEYS IN
CAPITAL CASES 105-07 (2006). Capital trial attorney Michael N. Burt explains:
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NARRATIVE WORKS

We have discussed examples of mitigation cases that failed when
the litigation focused on expert battles over evidence of ASPD,
psychopathy, and other psychiatric labels.' 1 4 Our discussion of
mitigation counter-narratives is inspired by our fruitless search for cases
in which the capital client won a battle of the experts over psychiatric
labels without also engaging the client's life story. The successful
mitigation cases that we found focused on symptoms and life history
more than on diagnoses and testing. They did not invariably ignore the
controversy over diagnosis, but the story, not the label, took center stage.
Thorough life history investigations enabled defense teams to
discover and tell stories about conditions and events that frustrated the
client's attempts to make it in life, and moved the decision-makers away
from death.' 15
Although we caution that focusing on diagnostic labels may simply
conjure up its own stereotype in the jurors' minds, expert witnesses may
indeed be an important part of the client's life narrative. Mental health
experts can help the defense team and the jury understand the client's
symptoms and impairments, and interpret the testimony of lay people
describing events that reveal the client's limitations. They can also help
the jury understand how symptoms and impairments are manifested at
different developmental stages, and the impact of these symptoms and
impairments on a client's perceptions, behavior, and functioning. If
presented in the context of a complete and accurate narrative, even prior
crimes or acts of violence can help a decision-maker understand the
client's state of mind at the time of the homicide. For example, in

The "record" at the trial level is primarily based upon the thorough life history
investigation that the capital defense team is constitutionally obligated to undertake. An
exhaustive social history investigation undertaken by a skilled mitigation specialist is
premised on the well-grounded assumptions that "no meaningful account of criminal
behavior can begin without extensive social historical knowledge about the life of the
perpetrator" and that "because people's actions are influenced in large part by their past
experiences, counter-normative behaviors (like crime) must be partly rooted in counternormative social historical experiences."
Burt, supra note 105, at 881 (quoting Craig Haney, Evolving Standards of Decency: Advancing the
Nature and Logic of CapitalMitigation, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 835, 843 (2008)).
114. See supranotes 26-51 and accompanying text.
115. See Mark E. Olive, Narrative Works, 77 UMKC L. REV. 989, 994-1003, 1006-16 (2009)
(discussing the successful post-conviction mitigation narratives presented in Gray v. Branker, 529
F.3d 220 (4th Cir. 2008), Williams v. Allen, 542 F.3d 1326 (1 1th Cir. 2008), and Walbey v.
Quarterman, 309 F. App'x 795 (5th Cir. 2009)). All three cases are good examples of developing a
persuasive counter-narrative in mitigation; in Walbev, the counter narrative trumped the trial
expert's testimony that his behavior was consistent with ASPD. Walbey, 309 F. App'x at 800-06.
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Rompilla v. Beard,1 16 records found in the file of Ronald Rompilla's
prior rape conviction pointed to school and social service records that
became a springboard for a robust mitigation narrative.1 17 In Atkins v.
Virginia,18 the underlying facts of Darryl Atkins' six prior ill-conceived
and poorly-executed criminal episodes that produced twenty-one felony
convictions underscored his intellectual disability. 119 Atkins' prior
crimes were an effective lens through which to view his struggles with
his intellectual disability. More often than not, "double-edged"
mitigation will provide critical clues to developing accurate and reliable
social histories and contextualizing the defendant's behaviors.1 20
Capital defense teams do not automatically shy away from double-edged
mitigation evidence when exploring and telling the client's life
story with the nuance and context that is core to an effective and
truthful narrative. 121
The role of narrative is so important to moving a decision-maker
toward life that experienced capital defense lawyers do not even select
mental health experts until they have conducted enough investigation to
know the client's life story, and what experts will be helpful in
communicating it to the jury:
Only after the social history data have been meticulously digested and
the multiple risk factors in the client's biography have been identified
will counsel be in a position to determine what kinds of culturally
116. 545 U.S. 374 (2005).
117. Id. at 389-93.
118. 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
119. See Brief for Petitioner at 12 n.20, Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (No. 00-8452).
120. The Supreme Court's analysis in Porterv. McCollum, 558 U.S. 30 (2009) illustrates this
point. The prosecution's case portrayed George Porter, Jr. as a violent drunk who murdered his
girlfriend and her new boyfriend after she attempted to end her tumultuous and abusive relationship
with Porter. See id. at 31-33. The Florida Supreme Court had concluded that Porter's military record
would have opened the door to adverse evidence that he went absent without leave and drank
heavily. Id. at 43-44. The Supreme Court rejected this conclusion as objectively unreasonable:
[T]he relevance of Porter's extensive combat experience is not only that he served
honorably under extreme hardship and gruesome conditions, but also that the jury might
find mitigating the intense stress and mental and emotional toll that combat took on
Porter. The evidence that he was AWOL is consistent with this theory of mitigation and
does not impeach or diminish the evidence of his service. To conclude otherwise reflects
a failure to engage with what Porter actually went through in Korea.
Id. Further, the Court reasoned, "[i]t is unreasonable to discount to irrelevance the evidence of
Porter's abusive childhood, especially when that kind of history may have particular salience for a
jury evaluating Porter's behavior in his relationship with Williams." Id. at 43.
121. WHITE, supra note 113, at 85 ("[E]xperienced capital defense attorneys invariably
conclude that mitigating evidence must be presented, even if there is some chance that the jury may
view it as double-edged."), Capital defense attorneys are trained to "always present mitigating
evidence that will explain the defendant's background and history to the jury, thereby enabling the
jury to gain an understanding of the defendant as a person." Id.
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competent experts are appropriate to the needs of the case, what role

the experts 122
will play, and what referral questions will be asked of
the experts.
Rather than asking experts to diagnose a client and opine whether his
condition triggers statutory defenses or mitigating circumstances,
experienced defense lawyers frame referral questions in the language
that will help tell the client's mitigating life story. They will want the
expert to help explain how the client's mental impairments "explain or
contribute to [his behavior] . .

. ,

especially as it relates to the crime," or

whether the client "suffer[s] from mental health difficulties that the
decision-maker might find mitigating even though they did not directly
lead to the defendant's criminal behavior. 1 23 Other possible referral
questions include the course of the defendant's mental difficulties, how
his multiple impairments interact with one another to influence his
behavior or impair his functioning, whether he was treated prior to the
crime, or whether he would respond to treatment in a prison setting.1 24 In
formulating referral questions, counsel should be mindful that much
more important than diagnosis are the social, psychological,
developmental, familial, cultural, religious, and environmental factors
that played a role in shaping the client's development and functioning.
Such questions are much more likely to generate thorough, thoughtful
exploration of the client's life, and will inevitably produce humanizing
narratives that demonstrate the client's strengths and frailties. Diagnoses,
psychometric test scores, and brain scans are not narratives. These tools
persuade only when accompanied by compelling stories that reveal the
client's intrinsic humanity.
What do we mean by narrative, and how does it work in a capital
case? In the legal arena, narrative is "factual and truthful storytelling,
meticulously built upon a record.' 25 More succinctly, narrative is
"[c]hronology with meaning."' 126 More importantly, it is a way of
communicating information in a form that is accessible to decisionmakers. Unlike facts offered to refute the prosecutor's case for death,
"[n]arratives do not contradict theories but cut across them; the two are
122. Russell Stetler, Mental Health Evidence and the Capital Defense Function: Prevailing
Norms, 82 UMKC L. REV. 407, 427 (2014).

123. Richard G. Dudley, Jr. & Pamela Blume Leonard, Getting It Right: Life History
Investigation as the Foundationfor a Reliable Mental Health Assessment, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 963,

985 (2008).
124. Id.
125. Philip N. Meyer, Are the Characters in a Death Penalty Brief Like the Characters in a
Movie?, 32 VT. L. REV. 877, 877-78 (2008).

126. Jon Franklin, The Narrative Tool, Am. EDITOR,
98.octnov/franklinl.htm (last updated Dec. 2, 1998).

https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol43/iss3/6

http://files.asne.org/kiosk/editor/

24

O'Brien and Wayland: Implicit Bias and Capital Decision-Making: Using Narrative to Cou

2015]

IMPLICIT BIAS AND CAPITAL DECISION-MAKING

incommensurate." '27 Although we may speak about a capital defense
team's "theory of mitigation," what we really mean is, "[w]hat is your
mitigation story?" This is why experts, such as Dr. Haney, consistently
talk about the mitigation "counter narrative" as the key to bringing the
128
decision-maker to an empathetic understanding of the defendant.
Stories of the client's life reveal his innate human qualities, his
flaws as well as his strengths, and enable decision-makers to see him as
like themselves.
Rompilla is perhaps the best-known story of a mitigation counternarrative overcoming the antisocial stereotype that was created by trial
counsel's shallow investigation. 29 Rompilla was convicted of killing
tavern owner James Scanlon at his bar, the Cozy Corner Cafe, by
stabbing him repeatedly and setting him on fire. 130 Rompilla stole
Scanlon's wallet and between $500 and $1000 from the bar. 131 At
approximately 6:30 a.m., later that morning, Scanlon's son found his
father's body lying behind the bar in a pool of blood.132 The
circumstantial evidence against Rompilla was strong; his own statement
and witnesses placed him in the Cozy Corner Cafe the evening before
the murder, and he was seen making repeated trips to the bathroom,
which was the burglar's point of entry.133 Blood on Rompilla's sneaker
matched Scanlon's blood type, and the sneaker's tread matched bloody
footprints at the scene of the murder. 34 Scanlon's wallet was found in
the bushes a few feet from the hotel room Rompilla rented the night of
the murder, and Rompilla's fingerprint was recovered from one of the
knives used to stab Scanlon to death.135 In the penalty phase of trial, the
jury found statutory aggravating circumstances that Rompilla killed
Scanlon "while in the perpetration of a felony," that "[t]he offense was
committed by means of torture, and that [Rompilla] had a significant
history of felony convictions involving the use or threat of violence to
the person."'' 3 6 The last aggravator was supported by Rompilla's two
127. AMSTERDAM &BRUNER, supra note 12, at 12.
128. See Haney, Prison Violence, supranote 12, at 928-29.
129. See Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 393 (2005), rev'g Rompilla v. Hom, 355 F.3d 233
(3d Cir. 2004).
130. Id. at 377. This description of Rompilla's crime is condensed from the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court's opinion affirming the conviction on direct appeal. Commonwealth v. Rompilla,
653 A.2d 626, 628-29, 634 (Pa. 1995), aff'd in part, rev 'd in partsub nom. Rompilla v. Horn, 355
F.3d 233 (3d Cir. 2004).
131. Rompilla, 63 A.2d at 629.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.at 629-30.
136. Id. at 634 n.13.
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prior convictions, one for rape and the other for a burglary, during which
he threatened the victim with a knife. 137 Rompilla was sentenced
to death. 3 '
Rompilla's trial counsel presented a defense that U.S. District
Judge Ronald L. Buckwalter described as "unreasonably brief and
139
lacking in real substance considering the nature of the proceedings."'
Trial counsel's investigation was limited to interviews with the client,
his ex-wife, sister-in-law, and three of his five siblings-a very narrow
sampling of sources. 140 The family told counsel "that they didn't really
feel as though they knew him all that well since he had spent the
majority of his adult years and some of his childhood years in custody,"
and Rompilla himself said that his childhood and schooling
Judge Buckwalter summarized the penalty
had been "normal.''
phase presentation:
Petitioner's counsel called five witnesses on his behalf at that hearing:
Darlene Rompilla, his sister-in-law; Nicholas Rompilla, Junior, an
older brother; Robert Rompilla, a younger brother; Sandy Whitby, a
sister; and Aaron Rompilla, a son who was 14 at that time.... Not one
witness discussed [Rompilla's] traumatic childhood, his alcoholism,
mental retardation, cognitive impairment or organic brain disorder.
What they did say were, "He was a good family member"; "We never
had a problem"; I don't think my brother did it"; "Have mercy on
him"; "I was close to him, he loved my family, he just didn't have a
chance"; "They didn't give him no rehabilitation"; "Why can't he get
help like all the rest of the people get help"; "I love him very much"
bad side of my brother, never"; "He just
(crying); "I've never seen the
142
loves us like we love him."'
Although the jury did not hear from mental health experts, defense
counsel consulted two psychiatrists and a psychologist who evaluated
Rompilla 43 Based on their testing and the history described in the
preceding paragraphs, "the experts found nothing helpful to Rompilla's

137. Id. at633-34.
138. Id.at 628,634.
139. Rompilla v. Horn, No. 99-737, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9620, at *13 (E.D. Pa. July 11,
2000), aff'd in part, revd in part, 355 F.3d 233 (3d Cir. 2004).
140. Rompilla v. Horn, 355 F.3d 233, 241 (3d Cir. 2004), rev'd sub nom. Rompilla v. Beard,
545 U.S. 374 (2005).
141. Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 381-82 (2005).
142. Rompilla, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9620, at *11-12, aff'd in part, rev'd in part, Rompilla,
355 F.3d 233.
143. Commonwealth v. Rompilla, 721 A.2d 786, 790 (Pa. 1998), aff'd in part, rev'd in part
sub nom. Rompilla v. Horn, 355 F.3d 233 (3d Cir. 2004).
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case and diagnosed him as a sociopath." 144 The Pennsylvania Supreme
Court concluded that because of this diagnosis, "counsel had a
reasonable basis for proceeding as they did.' ' 145 Thus, trial counsel's
inaction enabled Rompilla's family to dupe the jury into believing that
they had given Rompilla a "normal" upbringing, and therefore the fault
for Rompilla's criminal behavior lay exclusively with him. The
diagnosis of ASPD fit that false picture perfectly, so trial counsel were
justified to abandon pursuit of mitigating evidence of Rompilla's mental
health impairments, or so it seemed.
A thorough postconviction investigation proved the trial experts
wrong; Rompilla's family had betrayed him. Trial counsel themselves
became significant players in Rompilla's tragic life story when they
failed in their duty to investigate his defense. Postconviction counsel
gathered extensive life history documents, including a mental evaluation
conducted in connection with Rompilla's rape prosecution, a copy of
which was in the court file stored in the same courthouse in which
Rompilla was tried for murder-all trial counsel needed to do was walk
across the hall and ask for it. 146 Rompilla's sisters, Randi Rompilla and
Barbara Harris, lived in town and attended the trial, but were never
interviewed. 147 The necessity to investigate further was so obvious that
the court concluded that competent counsel "could not reasonably have
ignored mitigation 48evidence or red flags" pointing to the need to
investigate further. 1
The new data "destroyed the benign conception of Rompilla's
upbringing and mental capacity defense counsel had formed from
talking with Rompilla himself and some of his family members, and
from the reports of the mental health experts."'' 49 The court summarized
a portion of the new evidence of Rompilla's childhood:
Rompilla's parents were both severe alcoholics who drank constantly.
His mother drank during her pregnancy with Rompilla, and he and his
brothers eventually developed serious drinking problems. His father,
who had a vicious temper, frequently beat Rompilla's mother, leaving
her bruised and black-eyed, and bragged about his cheating on her. His
parents fought violently, and on at least one occasion his mother
stabbed his father. He was abused by his father who beat him when he

144.
145.

Id.
Id. at 789-90.

146. Rompilla v. Horn, 355 F.3d 233, 282 (3d Cir. 2004) (Sloviter, J., dissenting), rev'd sub
nom. Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374 (2005).
147. Id. at 280.
148. Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 391 n.8 (2005).
149. Id. at391.
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was young with his hands, fists, leather straps, belts and sticks. All of
the children lived in terror. There were no expressions of parental love,
affection or approval. Instead, he was subjected to yelling and verbal
abuse. His father locked Rompilla and his brother Richard in a small
wire mesh dog pen that was filthy and excrement filled. He had an
isolated background, and was not allowed to visit other children or to
speak to anyone on the phone. They had no indoor plumbing in the
house, he slept in the attic with no heat, and the children were not
given clothes and attended school in rags.150
Easily obtained school, medical, juvenile, and prison records
established that before Rompilla dropped out of school, his mother was
reported "missing from home frequently" for weeks at a time, and was
"frequently under the influence of alcoholic beverages, with the result
that the children have always been poorly kept and on the filthy side
which was also the condition of the home at all times."' 15 School records
showed Rompilla's IQ was in the intellectually disabled range.' 5 At age
sixteen, Rompilla quit school and began a series of juvenile
incarcerations for assaultive behavior "related to over-indulgence in
alcoholic beverages., 153 The juvenile incarceration files contained
reports "pointing to schizophrenia and other disorders, and test scores
showing a third grade level of cognition after nine years of
schooling. 1 54 A reasonable investigation enabled mental health experts
to credibly explain that Rompilla's mother's alcoholism during her
pregnancy with him resulted in organic brain damage; his
impulsive behavior and cognitive deficits were consistent with fetal
alcohol syndrome. 115
The new narrative based on a thorough investigation worked;
Rompilla's sentence of death was vacated, and on remand, the
Allentown prosecuting attorney waived the death penalty, commuting
Rompilla's sentence to life. 156 While the courts mention, in passing, a
variety of psychiatric and cognitive disabilities from which Rompilla
may suffer, including schizophrenia, mental retardation, and fetal
alcohol syndrome, his claim for relief did not depend upon staking out a

150. Id. at 391-92 (quoting Rompilla, 355 F.3d at 279).
151. Id.
at 393.
152. Id.
153. Id. at390-91.
154. Id. at 391.
155. Id. at 391-92 (quoting Rompilla, 355 F.3d at 282).
156. Allentown Man to Spend Life in Prisonfor 1988 Murder, DAILY AM. (Aug. 13, 2007),
http://articles.dailyamerican.com/2007-08-13/news/26304740 1_ronald-rompilla-allentown-tavemowner-allentown-man.
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position based on a diagnostic label.157 Unlike the decisions in
Pinholster, Overstreet, and Williams v. Allen,"5 8 Rompilla's lawyers and
experts did not square off over labels. Postconviction counsel understood
that "not antisocial" is not a theory of mitigation. Mental health expert
assessments played a supporting role in Rompilla's life story; it was the
powerful narrative of his tragic childhood, his trial counsel's inept
representation, and his sisters' love that saved him from execution.
Rompilla fits a pattern that we found among successful cases
involving mental and cognitive impairments; the client's humanizing life
story takes center stage, and mental health experts play a supporting
role. In Parkus v. Delo, 59 Steven Parkus' life-long pattern of running
away, truancy, and institutionalization prompted pretrial diagnoses of
ASPD by both state and defense examiners, but those experts repudiated
their findings upon learning that, at age four, Parkus had been placed in
foster care with an uncle who was a sadistic pedophile. 60 In Stankewitz
v. Wong, 161 although the prosecution mustered substantial aggravating
evidence showing that Douglas Stankewitz "had a violent, antisocial
personality," it was overcome by the story of Stankewitz's tragic
childhood.161 In Cooper v. Secretary, Department of Corrections,163
Richard Cooper's own defense lawyer presented evidence that he had
ASPD, which in the view of the trial court "merely buttressed the state's
contention that an aspect of Cooper's character was that he was really

157. Indeed, comorbidity is so common among capital defendants that, in many cases, multiple
conditions could be diagnosed. This is particularly true with respect to trauma. Wayland, supra note
30, at 941 (explaining that "the vast majority of people who meet diagnostic criteria for PTSD also
meet diagnostic criteria for one or more additional psychiatric disorders").
158. 542 F.3d 1326(1lth Cir. 2008).
159. 33 F.2d 933 (8th Cir. 1994).
160. Id. at 935-36, 939-40. Parkus was eventually removed from death row pursuant to Atkins
v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002), the only circumstance in which a diagnostic label matters because
it results in a categorical exclusion from capital punishment. See In re Parkus, 219 S.W.3d 250, 25256 (Mo. 2007) (en banc).
161. 698 F.3d 1163 (9th Cir. 2012).
162. Id.at 1173. The court was moved by evidence that "Stankewitz was born into a povertystricken home described by police and probation reports as dirty, covered in cockroaches and fleas,
and without electricity or running water," and that "[t]here was often not enough food for
Stankewitz and his nine siblings." Id. at 1168. Stankewitz's mother was an alcoholic since
childhood, severely intellectually impaired, and "she would regularly drink three to four six packs
of beer or two fifths of a gallon of whiskey in a night, including while she was pregnant with
Stankewitz." Id.Mrs. Stankewitz was beaten severely by Stankewitz's father, Robert, while she was
pregnant, and both parents beat Stankewitz and his siblings regularly and severely with electrical
cords, and belts, and threatened them with a gun. Id.The court easily concluded that Stankewitz's
impulsive behavior was attributable to "significant emotional damage [that] followed from his
troubled childhood." Id. at 1169.
163. 646 F.3d 1328 (11th Cir. 2011).
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without remorse. 1 64 A thorough life history investigation told a story
that was so different that a reasonable jury would not have sentenced
him to die.1 65 We found many other examples of successful defense
cases in which a thorough life history investigation produced a
compelling and truthful mitigation counter-narrative
against which
166
claims of ASPD faded into insignificance.
V.

CONCLUSION

Our research led us to conclude in our original article that the
"enormous contextual problems that plague mental health evaluations"
that inappropriately label defendants as "antisocial" or "psychopathic"
contribute to a "misinformed and badly skewed vision" of capital
decision-makers.
We, again, urged adherence to the standards of
performance articulated in the Guidelines and Supplementary
Guidelines, "including the admonition that at least one member of the
team be qualified, by training or experience, to identify symptoms and
characteristics of mental and emotional impairment."' 168 Experienced
capital defense attorneys understand that "it is critically important to

164. Id. at 1340-41.
165. See id. at 1355-56. A thorough life history investigation produced documents, evidence,
and testimony establishing that since he was barely out of diapers, Cooper received daily beatings
from his father, who beat, punched, and kicked Cooper and his siblings and "pick[ed] [them] up off
[their] feet and slam[med] [them] against the wall." Id. at 1342. Cooper's father used "boards,
switches, belts, and horse whips, leaving welts up and down their bodies and bruises from being
grabbed and hit so hard." Id. at 1343. In spite of the beatings, Cooper loved his father, and "was
always wanting to kill himself because he thought he was the one causing the problems." Id.
Cooper's father also withheld food as punishment, and Cooper and his brother "would go out to the
bam and eat dog food and drink horse's milk from their nursing mare." Id. at 1344. A psychologist
testified in Cooper's postconviction hearing; without harping on a particular diagnosis, he explained
to the court the damage that Cooper suffered as a result of "[p]sychological abuse and an extreme
deprivation of security and love." Id. at 1345. The court's extensive discussion of Cooper's life
story, along with its relatively brief description of the expert's harmonious findings that emphasized
impairment and symptoms over testing and diagnosis, demonstrates that Cooper's tragic life story
transcended diagnostics and psychometrics.
166. See, e.g., Blystone v. Hom, 664 F.3d 397, 427 (3rd Cir. 2011) (finding that "the result of
his sentencing hearing would have been different, had counsel conducted an adequate investigation
of mitigating circumstances"); Goodwin v. Johnson, 632 F.3d 301, 328 (6th Cir. 2011) (holding that
there was "little trouble finding a reasonable probability that at least one juror would have voted
against death had defense counsel attempted to humanize Goodwin by presenting evidence of the
hardships and disadvantages he faced growing up"); Correll v. Ryan, 539 F.3d 938, 954 (9th Cir.
2008) (finding that "the evidence of [Michael] Correll's 'excruciating' history could have provided
an altemative-and much more sympathetic-context for the horrific observations and conclusions
that were before the judge in the presentence report").
167. Wayland & O'Brien, supra note 1, at 586-88.
168. Id.at 588.
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construct a persuasive narrative in support of the case for life, rather than
'1 69
to simply present a catalog of seemingly unrelated mitigating factors."
We also advised, as we do here:
The best antidote to the influence of prejudicial psychiatric labels is a
compelling mitigating narrative based on a thorough life history
investigation which uncovers humanizing conditions and events in the
client's life that demonstrate his human complexity, including the
mental, emotional, or developmental impairments which he has
struggled to overcome.170
Psychometric testing and diagnostic labels are incapable of capturing the
complexity and uniqueness of our clients; only through a narrative life
history presentation can we communicate his or her innate humanity:
Significantly, the defendant's personal history and family life, his
obsessions, aspirations, hopes, and flaws, are rarely a matter of
physical evidence. Instead they are both discovered and portrayed
through narrative, incident, scene, memory, language, style, and even a
whole array of intangibles like eye contact, body movement, patterns
of speech-things that to17 1a jury convey as much information, if not
more, as any set of facts.
Narrative is critical; "a plea for mercy in conclusory terms such as
'he is a good person, friendly, nice, polite, hard-working, decent,
compassionate,' et cetera has not proven to be particularly helpful" in
persuading a judge or jury to spare a defendant's life.1 72 For decades,
capital defense attorneys have understood that "[i]t is always best to
have the family and friends testify anecdotically about incidents in the
defendant's life; ' 173 "[w]e have long known that client stories are crucial
in litigation.' 74 The Supreme Court itself has found that defense lawyers
performed deficiently for failing to develop a "powerful mitigating
narrative. 1' 75 Nowhere is this more important than in death penalty cases
169. ABA GUIDELINES, supranote 3, Guideline 10.11, at 1061.
170. Wayland & O'Brien, supra note 1, at 586.
171. Lacey Fosburgh, The Nelson Case: A Model for a New Approach to Capital Trials, in
CALIFORNIA DEATH PENALTY MANUAL N-6, N-7 (Supp. 1982). Lacey Fosburgh's article explains
the necessity of working with a mitigation specialist, a member of the defense team who "should
have nothing else to do but work with the defendant, his family, friends, enemies, business
associates and casual acquaintances, perhaps even duplicating some of what the private detective
does, but going beyond that and looking for more." Id.
172. Marshall Dayan, The Penalty Phase of the Capital Case: Good Character Evidence,
CHAMPION, June 1991, at 15, 15.

173. Dennis N. Balske, The Penalty-Phase Trial: A PracticalGuide, CHAMPION, Mar. 1984, at
40, 44.
174. Edwards, supranote 21, at 883-84.
175. Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 537-38 (2003).
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in which the prosecution relies on the highly questionable construct of
176
psychopathy and flawed diagnoses of ASPD.
We are grateful to have this opportunity to supplement those
conclusions with our discussion of what the field of cognitive
psychology adds to our understanding of why a narrative account of the
client's life story is an essential ingredient to the mitigation case. Each
capital case decider comes to the case with preconceived notions of
persons who commit violent crimes and what should be done with them,
and charts, graphs, scans, or psychiatric jargon are not likely to reach
them. Even though cognitive psychology informs us that these
"categories are made in the mind and not found in the world,"177
'
logic
and data alone are incapable of modifying the world-view of
death-qualified jurors and judges. Only the truthful and detailed
narrative of the client's life story can provide the essential context
that enables decision-makers to respond empathetically to the client,
and extend mercy even for the most terrible crime. As Dr. Haney urges,
"the now well-established use of these more valid, nuanced,
psychologically-sophisticated
mitigating counter-narratives in capital
17
cases must continue." 8

176. See John F. Edens, Unresolved Controversies Concerning Psychopathy: Implicationsfor
Clinical and Forensic Decision Making, 37 PROF. PSYCHOL. RES. & PRAC. 59, 59 (2006); see also

Wayland & O'Brien, supra note 1, at 531-66.
177. AMSTERDAM & BRUNER, supranote 12, at 9.
178. Haney, Prison Violence, supra note 12, at 945.
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